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1 
Abstract: 
 
The paper surveys problems of conceptualisations of welfare state change and suggests that 
they can only be solved by distinguishing between different dimensions of change. Four 
dimensions are spelled out: Level of change, direction of change, dynamics of change, and 
degree of change. As to levels of change, it is argued that we should distinguish between 
five sub-dimensions: paradigms/discourse, institutions, policy, expenditures, and out-
comes. Changes at these levels may be parallel, but often, they are not. What counts, in the 
final analysis, as the most important measure of change, is outcomes, in particular out-
comes on citizenship. 
Further, it is argued that evaluations of change have to build on a governance or welfare 
mix approach to welfare that includes not only state welfare but all collective welfare ef-
forts, including the role of the social partners, social responsibility of firms, and various 
mixes of state/market arrangements.  
Finally, to assess the full impact of change, not least the impact of changing responsibili-
ties between state and non-state actors, we should include evaluations of likely policy 
feedbacks and future path dependencies. 
2 
1. Introduction 
 
Measuring welfare state change is probably one of the most controversial tasks in com-
parative social policy research. Since social expenditure figures were given up as the key 
measure of the welfare state, there have not been any agreed-upon concepts or standards of 
measurement to describe change. The obvious alternative to expenditure figures is institu-
tional change, but as will emerge below, institutional change of the welfare state is not that 
easy to define and measure. Besides, it is not the only relevant criterion. This conceptual 
confusion, in turn, is reflected in rather different assessments of individual countries and/or 
policies, as well as in the vast number of more or less serious concepts that are offered to 
describe what is seen as the dominant trend in social protection. Further, it is reflected in 
emerging reservations to classic statements like “institutions matter”, not to mention earlier 
interpretations of path dependence as a static condition. At least there seems to be one ele-
ment of an emerging new consensus, namely that welfare states in fact change quite a lot.  
 Even though there are no simple solutions to the problem of conceptualising wel-
fare state change, is seems possible to reduce the confusion by identifying core aspects or 
dimensions of change, and by clarifying which of these aspects some of the most widely 
used concepts of change in the literature are referring to. This paper identifies four dimen-
sions as essential: 
• level of change: Change in paradigms, institutions, policy, expenditures or out-
comes? 
• direction of change: Retrenchment, decommodification or something else? 
• dynamic of change: Abrupt or incremental? 
• degree of change: Transformative or maintaining? 
However, it is increasingly recognized that we have to consider not only state welfare but 
the ensemble of institutions providing collective social protection. This can be formulated 
as a question of 
• object of change: State welfare or all collectively provided welfare? 
Finally, when it comes to the impacts of changing division of labour between institutions 
providing welfare, it is highly important also to consider the feedback process, that is, the 
• further impact of change: Short-term or long-term effects? 
This paper points out that the main problem of current conceptualisations of change is that 
they fail to distinguish sufficiently between different dimensions which are not always 
linked. For instance, Streeck & Thelen (2005) have argued that there is no simple corre-
spondence between dynamic and degree of change as implied by the “punctuated equilib-
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rium model”. Transformative changes are not always abrupt and dramatic, and incremental 
changes are not always maintaining. These are two separate dimensions; there are four 
possible combinations, and the combination incremental-transformative change has been 
neglected. Our suggestion in this paper is in a way equivalent to Streeck & Thelen’s argu-
ment, but includes a larger number of dimensions. 
 The paper begins with one of the most elaborated discussions about change, 
namely the debates over the “dependent variable problem”. Next, we point out the neces-
sity to consider not only state welfare but privately provided welfare as well. That is, the 
object of change is the entire constellation of collective social security arrangements. Then 
we deal with the four dimensions in turn. In particular, we shall focus on the question of 
levels of change, not least the relationship between institutional change and change in out-
comes. The further impact of change is discussed alongside the question of conver-
gence/divergence between welfare states. Finally, the conclusion points at some key ques-
tions for further conceptual development.  
 
2. Beyond the “dependent variable problem” 
 
In the 1990's, the “welfare modelling” literature (Abrahamson, 1999) and the retrenchment 
literature following Pierson's (1994) seminal book converged in the assumption that 
welfare states rarely changed very much. However, gradually it was recognized that 
welfare states exhibited “declining resistance to change” (van Kersbergen, 2000), and that 
“elephants (were) on the move” (Hinrichs, 2000). Resistance against change has remained 
an important research theme but is increasingly seen as conditional (Vis & van Kersbergen, 
2007). There is an emerging consensus that welfare states in fact change quite a lot, as 
reflected in headlines about “recalibration”, “restructuring”, “rethinking”, “transformation” 
(e.g. Ferrera & Rhodes, 2000; Pierson, 2001; Rothstein & Steinmo, 2002; Rein & 
Schmähl, 2004; Seeleib-Kaiser, 2007), or simply "reform" - even in the otherwise 
"resistant" Continental European welfare states (e.g. Taylor-Gooby, 2005; Ferrera, 2005; 
Clasen, 2005; Schludi, 2005; Rothgang et al., 2006; Ebbinghaus, 2006). Borrowing a 
phrase from another branch of literature, one might even say that in some countries, 
"reform has become the routine" (Brunsson & Olsen, 1993). 
  This undoubtedly reflects "declining resistance to change" and increasing velocity 
of reform in current welfare states. But it also reflects changing theoretical assessments in 
welfare state research. In particular it reflects a rediscovery of the transformative capacity 
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of “incremental change” (Lindblom, 1959; Goul Andersen, 2001; Palier, 2001; Goul 
Andersen & Larsen, 2002; Hinrichs & Kangas, 2003; Thelen, 2004: 31-37; Hacker, 2004). 
This also means that what could at first sight appear as marginal adjustment reveals itself 
as transformative change in a slightly longer time perspective (Streeck & Thelen, 2005).  
 At any rate, focus is currently on change rather than stability. But how should we 
measure change? And prior to that, how should we conceptualise welfare state change? In 
the retrenchment literature, this has been referred to as "the dependent variable problem" 
(Pierson, 2001: 420-22). However, this debate is mostly about indicators of retrenchment - 
about whether to use micro-level indicators like compensation rates, aggregate level meas-
ures like social expenditures, or indicators of institutional change (Green-Pedersen, 2004; 
for an overview of positions, see Powell, 2004). This is a highly relevant discussion, but 
the problem goes further. Change cannot simply be conceptualised as "retrenchment", and 
"austerity" cannot be seen as the only cause of welfare state transformations (Goul Ander-
sen, 1997; Palier, 2001; Starke, 2006). In some policy fields (e.g. when it comes to out-
sourcing, or to tightening the works test for unemployed), prosperity in fact seems more 
conducive to change than austerity (Pallesen, 2004; Goul Andersen & Pedersen, 2007).  
 However, once we move beyond retrenchment, we are in a bit of a conceptual 
mess (Goul Andersen, 2005a). Pierson (2001: 422-27) has suggested to distinguish 
between three "dimensions" of cost containment, recalibration, and recommodification. 
This is highly useful, but "recalibration" is a catch-all concept that tells little about 
direction, and the relationship between these three dimensions - if they really are 
"dimensions" - is not spelled out. Besides, if they are "dimensions" (rather than points at a 
scale of change), they are not very helpful to assess degree of change.  
 To assess degree of change was a main aim of Hall's (1993) distinction between 
first-, second- and third order change: First-order change refers to change in settings of 
existing instruments (for instance aiming at cost containment). Second-order change refers 
to change in instruments to obtain the same goal (this could be one way to conceive of  
Pierson's "recalibration"). Third-order change refers to paradigmatic change with changing 
goals and problem definitions - usually accompanied by major conflicts and institutional 
transformations. This distinction is helpful when different levels of change coincide, but it 
is modelled on the ideational dimension, and even paradigmatic changes sometimes take 
place without much immediate policy impact; furthermore, large changes in settings 
(sometimes accumulated over a period) may not only be crucial for outcomes; it may also 
be tantamount to a basic change in principles of the welfare state. 
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 Streeck &Thelen (2005) focus on institutional change (and elaborate on this con-
cept). They even imply that there is not always a straightforward correspondence between 
institutions and outcomes (as reflected in the concept of “conversion”, see below), but this 
is not spelled out in very much detail, and their conception is based on a rather unidimen-
sional conception of the direction of change (regulation – liberalization). However, as 
pointed out below, outcomes (and the relationship between institutions and outcomes) 
should be our key concern; and there is need to consider other directions of change than 
liberalization. 
 In short, there is need to unpack the notion of change in order to develop more 
differentiated and multidimensional (but still relatively parsimonious) concepts. This task 
goes well beyond the "dependent variable problem". Inevitably, discussions about 
conceptualisations of change also involves questions about how to conceptualise the 
welfare state (Powell, 2004) - although we shall avoid going too far in this direction. This 
paper is so to speak about the "dependent variable problem writ large". 
 
3. The dimensions of change 
 
The distinctions between various dimensions of change can be made on the basis of a 
series of very simple questions (see also figure 1): 
 
• Change of what? As pointed out in discussions about the “dependent variable 
problem”, expenditure figures are insufficient measures of change, and they do not 
always correspond with other measures. We propose to distinguish between five  
different levels of change: paradigms or discourse,  institutions, policy , 
expenditures, and outcomes. Sometimes we find parallel changes at all these levels 
– but quite often, this is not the case, as will be pointed out below. 
• Change in what direction? A unidimensional description along an axis of 
expansion / retrenchment, or decommodification / recommodification seems 
insufficient. The axis of regulation / liberalisation does not bring us very much 
further. Below, we survey a few competing claims about direction of change.  
• Change in what way? - how are the dynamics of change? As indicated, change may 
be abrupt or incremental. Incremental changes often lead to "silent revolutions" - 
but they are "revolutions" none the less.  
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• How much change - what degree of change? It is conventional to distinguish 
between continuity / discontinuity, or between non-transformative / transformative 
change (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). We cannot come up with any final formula that 
delineates discontinuous, transformative change, but assessment must be based on 
measurement of change at all levels referred to above. 
 
Figure 1: Dimensions of welfare state change 
Dimension Sub-dimension 
Level of change Paradigms (discourses) 
 Institutions 
 Policy 
 Expenditure 
 Outcomes (impact) 
Direction of change  
Dynamics of change  
Degree of change  
 
 
This is not a list without priorities, however. If we accept that "social citizenship consti-
tutes the core idea of a welfare state" (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 21) and that social citizen-
ship is about the "right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civi-
lized being according to the standards prevailing in society" (Marshall, 1950), our key fo-
cus should be on outcomes (Jensen & Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Goul Andersen, 2005b; Goul 
Andersen & Guillemard, 2005).  It also seems plausible to follow Esping-Andersen’s 
(1990) argument that Marshall's notion of "social citizenship" is in fact tantamount to "de-
commodification". However, there is an ambiguity in the concept of decommodification. If 
we assume that decommodification is about citizenship – not only as a formal right, but as 
a practice (we leave out here the dimension of citizenship as an identity, see Goul Ander-
sen, 2005b) - it does not follow that welfare policies is only about "politics against mar-
kets" (Esping-Andersen, 1985). Much of the efforts of the welfare state in the field of ser-
vices is difficult to subsume under this headline; and even more importantly, adjusting wel-
fare states to act more in conformity with the market is not by definition tantamount to an 
erosion of citizenship. If we want to use the label recommodification to describe such ad-
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justments to market conformity, it seems impossible to maintain the equation of decom-
modification and social citizenship. 
 Furthermore, the emphasis on citizenship as the key concept in evaluation of out-
comes does not a priori rule out a redefinition of citizenship with more emphasis on right 
and duty to be active (Pfau-Effinger, 2005). This is not by definition tantamount to an ero-
sion of citizenship; this may certainly be the case if responsibility is shifted from the col-
lective to the individual, and if the result is a decline or polarisation in the “right to share to 
the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the stan-
dards prevailing in society”. But if this is not the case, such redefinitions may also be seen 
as a matter of modernization – as a way to maintain the ideal of full citizenship in a more 
individualised society with more efficacious citizens.  
 Next, if citizenship is a key criterion in the final assessment of outcomes, then it is 
crucial to consider the ensemble of institutions - for instance the entire configuration of a 
multipillar pension system. Looking at the state component in isolation - as the “power 
resources approach” (Korpi, 1983) is inclined to do - would imply a serious bias. As this is 
the point of departure for discussing the four dimensions of change, we have to deal briefly 
with the multipillar approach to welfare. In a dichotomous state vs. market world, mixed 
welfare by definition means liberalisation, recommodification and an erosion of social citi-
zenship. However, the situation is a bit more complicated. The question is not whether 
there is a mix of responsibilities, but how this is composed. 
 
4. Beyond state welfare 
 
Whereas comparative social policy research has mainly focussed on the role of the state, 
others (in particular economists) have been more inclined to see provision of welfare as a 
mix between different institutions (Barr, 1998; Kuhnle & Alestalo, 2000; Goodin & Rein, 
2001), and/or as a matter of insurance principles (Barr, 2001). Esping-Andersen (1999: 32-
46) has himself rephrased his regime theory in the language of both perspectives. This is 
important already when we discuss transfers, but the need to include such discussions be-
comes even stronger when we move to services which in some welfare states (notably the 
Scandinavian ones) constitute a much larger share of the total costs than transfers. One 
might also say that we should shift from a government perspective to a governance per-
spective on the welfare state (Goul Andersen, 2000b). 
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 There are three levels in this discussion – in the UK often labelled the “mixed 
economy of welfare” (Powell, 2007): (1) The division of labour between the state and 
other institutions, not least the market; (2) cooperation and mixed responsibilities between 
the state and the market1; and (3) introduction of market mechanisms inside the state.  
 From a welfare mix approach, a core question is about changes in the division of 
labour, not least the question if new combinations can produce equivalent outcomes. A 
classic is Johnson's (1987) discussion of "welfare pluralism", i.e. of new combinations of 
the state, the market, the family and voluntary associations. Graphically, this is sometimes 
illustrated as a welfare triangle or as a diamond (figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Multiple providers of welfare: The welfare triangle/diamond 
 
              
      STATE       
          
  MARKETS     FAMILIES   
              
            
    VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS     
            
 
 
 
Another is Gilbert & Gilbert's (1989: 163, 171-86) concept of "enabling state" which em-
phasizes the interaction between state and markets, in particular "public support for private 
responsibility". It portrays a vision of a broader array of institutions responsible for provi-
sion of welfare, including subsidized and regulated non-state activities (see also Gilbert, 
1995: 148-72). The concept of "enabling state" is extremely vague and ambiguous - in Gil-
bert (1995: 153-54), emphasis is more on duty to work and on balancing rights and obliga-
tions, and in Gilbert (2002) it includes almost any reduction of state responsibility for wel-
fare such as targeting benefits. Briefly, it is a catch-all concept that is contaminated by po-
litical usage. It is presented as an ideal type with various components, but if some sort of 
                                                 
1 In principle, this mix should also be extended to other actors, but we leave out this question here. 
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“institutional complementarity”2 is implied, the logics are not spelled out. 
 None the less, Gilbert's extension of the welfare mix approach can be elaborated 
to embrace an overview of various ways to provide collective responsibility for social wel-
fare. In the first place, a welfare mix model should also include the role of social partners 
and collective agreements (Rostgaard & Fridberg, 1998) as well as the social responsibility 
of firms (Martin, 2004; Bredgaard, 2004); both of these nowadays goes beyond what was 
traditionally labelled "occupational welfare". One might even construct an ideal-typical 
governance model of multiple providers coordinated by the state (Evers & Svetlik, 1991) 
which assumes final responsibility for outcomes. In the field of pensions, this has for long 
been discussed in terms of "multipillar" pension systems as far as macro level institutions 
are concerned (Myles & Pierson, 2001), and in terms of "income packaging" at the micro 
level (Rainwater et al., 1986; Rein & Stapf-Finé, 2004). However, as mentioned, we prefer 
to limit our focus to collective social responsibilities – state and non-state – leaving out 
completely individual arrangements. 
 As mentioned, it is not only a matter of division of labour between the state and 
the market (and other actors). The distinction between state and markets itself is blurred as 
there are in principle six possible combinations of production, regulation and financing of 
welfare tasks in-between pure state and pure markets - and even more, if we differentiate 
these concepts further (Barr, 1998: 96; Gilbert & Gilbert, 1989: 22-29; Seeleib-Kaiser, 
2007); see Figure 3. In a European context, full privatisation of welfare is rare, but semi-
privatisation is widespread. The most important forms are outsourcing to private provid-
ers, (tax) subsidies, vouchers, and user fees. Outsourcing and vouchers (Greve, 2002) 
maintain public financing but invite private providers - vouchers with freedom of the citi-
zen/user/consumer to choose between providers (which may be private or public). User 
fees, by contrast, do not involve competition, but privatise a part of the economic risk and 
have much more far-reaching impact on distribution. Small user fees are often recom-
mended by economists, however, as they serve to "test" (and limit) the demand for ser-
vices. Subsidies (tax deductions for private welfare) also have distributional consequences. 
 In principle, there are even more combinations. Mandatory (private) insurance is 
also a potential alternative to public welfare. It involves payment of market prices as well 
                                                 
2 This concept stems from the “Varieties of capitalism literature” (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 17) and simply 
means that institutions are logically connected so that “the presence of one increases the returns from the 
other”.  However, institutional complementarity is also implied in the welfare regime approach of Esping-
Andersen. Indeed the keyword “regime” simply means institutional complementarity (Goul Andersen, 
2007e). 
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as competition. Still, it differs from private insurance by being mandatory - and for in-
stance by the possibility to regulate against separation of risk pools for "good" and "bad" 
risks. Finally, in "free competition", public service agencies are allowed to offer supple-
mentary services at  
 
Figure 3: Eight possible combinations of state and market. 
 Regulation: 
Who decides 
Financing: 
Who pays 
Production 
Who provides 
1. Pure state + + + 
2. Outsourcing + + - 
3. User fees + - + 
4. Vouchers - + +/- 
5. Subsidized private welfare - +/- - 
6. Free competition  - - + 
7. Obligatory insurance + - - 
8. Pure market - - - 
 
 
market prices in open competition with private firms. Sometimes orthodox welfare sup-
porters and private firms may jointly oppose the latter type of arrangements - private firms 
because they fear unfair competition, and orthodox welfare supporters because they don't 
want public agencies to treat citizens differently, and because they fear that service institu-
tions will prioritise supplementary services (for better-off users), because of profit incen-
tives, and because this is where they are exposed to competition.  
 In principle, there are many more combinations, in particular if we differentiate 
the regulation dimension. The figure is just an illustration of the rich variety of possibili-
ties. 
 Finally – and this is the third aspect - the distinction between state and market is 
blurred by changes in the management of public services. Competition is not limited to 
competition between public and private. Speaking of social services, many scholars have 
underlined the "marketisation" or "commercialisation" of the welfare state in "New Public 
Management" reforms (Gilbert & Gilbert 1989: 27-29, Cutler & Waine, 1997; Blomqvist 
& Rothstein, 2000; Blomqvist, 2004). As much as possible, the public sector is reorganized 
to market-like conditions, e.g. by separation of buyers and providers, by quasi-markets, by 
contracts, by payment according to performance, new wage systems etc.  
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 Except for higher user fees, mandatory private insurance, subsidies, and free com-
petition, these changes do not have immediate distributional effects. We cannot discuss 
here how they may affect future power relations, or how they affect the ethos among wel-
fare "consumers" and "producers". Such feedback effects are certainly essential when it 
comes to evaluating long-term impacts. 
 But except for user fees, privatisation/commercialisation is not just a matter of 
retrenchment. Saving money is not always the purpose (and even less frequently the out-
come!). Whether the reforms succeed in providing higher quality or "more value for 
money", is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 These intermediaries are important, even in a Scandinavian welfare state like 
Sweden. Outsourcing and vouchers are comparatively widespread in Scandinavia (Greve, 
2002: 175-230; Goul Andersen, 2007b), and in Sweden, Lindqvist & Wadensjö's (2006, 
2007) systematic account of supplementary insurance in the field of income replacement 
revealed a surprisingly large number of non-state collective arrangements, negotiated in 
collective agreements, or provided by trade unions as mandatory or voluntary insurance.  
  
Figure 4:  An expanded welfare triangle/”governance model” of social welfare. 
              
      STATE       
          
  
commercialised 
state services     
subsidized family 
care   
              
 
outsourcing/ 
vouchers       FAMILY  
              
user financed pub-
lic welfare         
subsidized vol. 
assoc. 
              
 regulated markets       
VOLUNTARY 
ASSOCIATIONS  
            
  
tax subsidized 
market welfare     social partners   
12 
            
   MARKETS  
social responsibility of 
firms    
            
 
 
Finally, a welfare mix perspective must also include cash subsidies for households, e.g. for 
elderly care provided by family members. 
 The full welfare mix model is presented in figure 4. The diamond model of four 
independent institutions has been replaced by six basic institutions and seven intermediary 
forms. Only three of thirteen combinations are entirely non-state or non-collective. An as-
sessment of welfare state change has to address the changing division of responsibilities, 
and in particular what impact they have on citizenship. A narrow government approach 
focussing on pure state welfare would miss too much, in particular the role of the social 
partners and collective agreements, and it might easily lose sight of the multiple permuta-
tions.  
 Some of the tools to assess this welfare mix are provided by an insurance ap-
proach (Barr, 2001; Esping-Andersen, 1999: 32-46). From this perspective, a basic ques-
tions are about management of risk, in particular about risk coverage (which risks are cov-
ered by the state and collective arrangements, and how adequately?) and risk pooling (how 
much separation is there between risk groups and between social strata?).3 From this per-
spective, it does not matter per se whether welfare is provided by the state or by some 
other collective arrangement. What matters is risk coverage and risk pooling. Both may 
typically be narrower in non-state arrangements, but this is not necessarily the case.  
 The key question is whether such changes entail a privatisation of social risk and 
in particular an erosion of citizenship. The more actuarial arrangements are, the more one 
can speak of a privatisation of social risk (Barr, 2001: 24). This can happen even within 
pure state arrangements, however. For instance, a change from defined benefit to defined 
contribution pension schemes involves a certain privatisation of social risk.  
                                                 
3 Universal welfare states are characterised by broad and adequate risk coverage, and by all-encompassing, 
nation-wide risk pooling. Beveridgean welfare states are characterised by less adequate (and somewhat nar-
rower) coverage. Residual welfare states are characterised by much more narrow coverage and by even less 
adequate coverage, in particular for those who can afford market solutions. And corporatist welfare states are 
characterised by somewhat more narrow coverage, limited risk pooling across status groups, but adequate 
coverage except for the poor.  
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5. Direction of change: Cost containment, recommodification, recalibra-
tion 
 
Until recently, most discussions about direction of change have been phrased in the lan-
guage of retrenchment or in the language of recommodification. We do not suggest aban-
doning these concepts. But in the first place, they are not very clearly defined. And sec-
ondly, they do not seem sufficient to describe the direction of welfare state change. One of 
the most important directions to consider is the new mixes described above. However, we 
shall begin by going a bit deeper into the two concepts of recommodification and re-
trenchment. 
 
From social expenditures to recommodification 
From the most classical measure of the welfare state, public expenditures or social expen-
ditures as per cent of GDP, measuring welfare state change was in principle a simple task 
(e.g. Wilensky, 1975; Cameron, 1978) - apart from (quite troublesome) comparability 
problems in international statistiscs (Adema & Ladaique, 2005), business cycle adjust-
ments, aggregation problems etc. However, as argued by Esping-Andersen (1990: 19, 21) - 
perhaps overstating the point a bit - expenditure measures are theoretically unsatisfying. 
First, he regarded expenditures as epiphenomenal and found it "difficult to imagine that 
anyone struggled for spending per se". Secondly, there are important differences between 
countries with the same level of spending. Like others, Esping-Andersen (1990) went back 
to the classical notions on principles of welfare: residual vs. institutional welfare states, 
developed by Wilensky & Lebeaux (1958) and Titmuss (1958), and the "industrial 
achievement-performance model", developed by Titmuss (1974), to elaborate the three 
welfare regime ideal types.4 As a corollary, the central question of change would be change 
between these principles, in particular changes along the residual vs. institutional axis. 
 The most important difference between these regimes, Esping-Andersen con-
tended, was the degree of de-commodification.5 This concept (originally developed by 
                                                 
4  Whereas the former concepts were only about principles of welfare, Esping-Andersen went further, how-
ever, by spelling out also the relationship between the state, the labour market and the family. To underline 
this further, and because of stronger emphasis on the family and "de-familialization", the concept of "welfare 
state regime" was substituted by welfare regime in Esping-Andersen (1999). 
5 Esping-Andersen's theory is open to interpretations because of somewhat unclear distinctions between in-
dependent and dependent variables. If these are juxtaposed, de-commodification can be presented as the most 
important among two or three criteria including stratification of welfare rights (Arts & Gelissen, 2002) and 
the private-public mix (Bambra, 2006). Alternatively, de-commodification can be regarded as the dependent 
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Offe, 1984; Esping-Andersen, 1985), in turn, was linked to T.H.Marshall's (1950) idea of 
social citizenship: "it is one way of specifying T.H.Marshall's notion of social citizenship 
rights" (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 43) which "few can disagree ... constitutes the core idea 
of a welfare state" (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 21). By definition, then, the most basic change 
of welfare states is a matter of decommodification vs. recommodification. Unlike expendi-
tures, which is about input/policy, and principles which is about institutions, decommodifi-
cation and citizenship is basically about outcomes, about equal status as citizens (Goul An-
dersen, 2005b: Loftager, 2003). Accordingly, Esping-Andersen's operationalisations are 
based on outcome measures or proxies for outcomes (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 54; Pierson, 
2001: 423).6 
 De-commodification is defined by Esping-Andersen (1999: 43) as "the degree to 
which welfare states ... (grant) ... entitlements independent of market participation". The 
equation of de-commodification and citizenship helps to interpret this quote which is rather 
ambiguous.7 (Full) citizenship is about having (de facto) equal status as citizens in spite of 
inequality of market position. This presupposes adequate social rights enabling people to 
participate in social and political life. In a Marshallean perspective, decommodification 
does not mean that workers are free to opt out of work. This might be the ultimate stage of 
de-commodification; but with the possible exception of Denmark from the mid-1970's to 
the mid-1990's (Goul Andersen, 1996) the duty to work has by tradition been very strong 
in Scandinavia – not least in Sweden, usually considered the heaven of de-
commodification. Indices like duty to work are also absent in Esping-Andersen's (1990) 
operationalisations which are consistent with the Marshallean perspective. 
 But what does re-commodification mean, then? This concept has seemingly not 
been used by Esping-Andersen himself. Pierson (2001) also does not supply precise defini-
tions, perhaps because his argument is that retrenchment is typically not about recommodi-
fication. However, the implicit definition is at least different from Marshallean citizenship. 
Decommodification is referred to as "those aspects of the welfare state that shelter workers 
from market pressures, forcing them to accept jobs on employers' terms" (Pierson, 2001: 
422). Later he remarks that "work incentives have been the focus of concern in many cases 
                                                                                                                                                    
variable. In terms of de-commodification, the regime model predicts three groupings of high, moderate and 
low de-commodification. 
6  We shall not discuss the operationalisation in terms of entitlements which has been questioned both on 
theoretical (Korpi, 2002) and empirical grounds (Scruggs, 2006). 
7  This holds also for the original formulation in Esping-Andersen (1990: 21-22): "De-commodification oc-
curs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without 
reliance on the market." 
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... Yet there remains considerable variation ... reform is often not primarily about re-
commodification" (Pierson, 2001: 423). In the implicit definition in these quotes, re-
commodification is more about duty or incentives to work and less about social rights and 
equal status. This is also clear from Pierson's empirical indicators (Pierson, 2001: 434): 
Cutbacks in transfers to those of working age out of the labour force by means of tighter 
eligibility rules, and/or reduced entitlements. In short, "making work pay" is a core element 
of recommodification. This definition is certainly legitimate - and undoubtedly the most 
widely used in discussions of welfare state change, but it deviates from a Marshallean no-
tion of citizenship (see also Goul Andersen, 2005b).  
 Arguably, measures like strengthening work incentives and entitlements/ eligibil-
ity, or liberalizing employment protection do not per se violate citizenship as long as social 
protection is sufficiently generous to enable full participation in social life as citizens. In 
fact, although less convincingly, such measures have even been launched as means to en-
sure social inclusion. We suggest distinguishing between recommodification defined as 
erosion of social citizenship8 and strengthening of incentives and duty to work.  
 "Flexicurity" is an instance of a strengthening of incentives and duty to work 
which is not by definition tantamount to recommodification in terms of citizenship. At least 
that would run counter to the way in which it is usually legitimised (Madsen, 2002).  
 
Retrenchment 
Retrenchment is a broader and vaguer concept. Pierson (1994) has often been misrepre-
sented to mean that retrenchment is just about spending cuts, which is misleading (Powell, 
2004). Retrenchment is defined by Pierson "to include policy changes that either cut social 
expenditure, restructure welfare state programs to conform more closely to the residual 
welfare state model, or alter the political environment in ways that enhance the probability 
of such outcomes in the future" (Pierson, 1994: 17). The latter is about "systemic re-
trenchment" (aimed at changing conditions of future decision making) which we leave 
aside here. Among the two first elements - "programmatic retrenchment" - short- and long-
term expenditure cuts is the most simple aspect, and as pointed out by Pierson, expenditure 
cuts are not just "epiphenomenal to the theoretical substance of welfare states" anymore. 
On the contrary, "fight against spending ... is a defining characteristic of the era of auster-
ity", Pierson (2001: 423) contends.  
                                                 
8  Indicators are lower replacement rates, stronger dependence of social rights on former labour market posi-
tion, the acid test being levels of poverty and inequality in living conditions among those unemployed. 
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 The institutional aspect - more conformity "with the residual welfare state model" 
- refers to institutional change along the institutional-residual axis such as "(1) significantly 
increasing reliance on means-tested benefits; (2) major transfers of responsibility to the 
private sector; and (3) dramatic changes in benefit and eligibility rules that signal a qualita-
tive reform of a particular program"  Pierson (1996: 157).  
 Pierson himself has recognized that welfare states are restructured but points out 
(2001: 422-27) that retrenchment is not only a matter of recommodification (as implied by 
the power resources model); it can also be about simple cost containment, or it can be 
about "recalibration" – vaguely defined as (minor) "reforms which seek to make contem-
porary welfare states more consistent with contemporary goals and demands for social 
provision" - for instance "updating" to new problems, or "rationalization" to remove obvi-
ous disincentives. This is explicitly presented as three "dimensions" of retrenchment. 
However, they seem to be function also as three degrees of retrenchment, with recommodi-
fication at the highest level: As indicated by the definitions above, recommodification is 
defined by Pierson as institutional change that brings more conformity with the residual 
model. Cost containment is more or less proportional cuts in budgets without any institu-
tional changes.  
 The category of "recalibration" is quite plausible. It is certainly possible to de-
scribe most current restructuring of the welfare state as "recalibration". The only problem 
is that it functions a bit too well. If anything can be labelled recalibration, the concept be-
comes less informative. We need categories that are somewhat more specific about direc-
tion of change. Below we (re-)introduce a few examples.  
 
Changing principles 
A large part of concepts offered to describe directions of change stems from researchers 
who believe to have discovered new universal megatrends in the development of the wel-
fare state, sold under various persuasive labels. Another approach, found in Clasen & van 
Oorschot (2002), and in Barbier & Theret (2003) is to examine openly the development in 
underlying principles structuring eligibility and entitlements in core areas of social protec-
tion. This overlaps with recommodification only if more liberal principles prevail; but it 
also leaves open that principles in practice might overall become more universal - or more 
achievement/ performance (reciprocity-) oriented, for that sake. Arguably, in a Scandina-
vian welfare state like Denmark, universalism was strengthened and not weakened during 
the period of most intense cost containment in the 1980’s (Goul Andersen, 2000). 
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 One change of regime principles, targeting of social benefits, or de-universali-
sation, has been the object of much interest (Gilbert, 2001). It involves a change towards a 
"residual model", as advocated by international governmental organizations like the World 
Bank (Estes & Phillipson, 2002). The concept of targeting is narrower than recommodifi-
cation even in its Marshallean meaning which may include both more targeting and lower 
compensation rates for everybody. On closer inspection, targeting (or de-universalisation) 
is very difficult to specify and operationalise. In the first place, targeting must be seen in 
context. The concept of targeting (or de-universalisation) is developed to describe univer-
sal/institutional vs. residual welfare state. If it is to be used to analyse corporatist or Bis-
marckian welfare states, it needs to be adapted (Ferrera, 2001). The same holds for welfare 
states switching to defined contribution schemes (another instance of recommodification, 
but not of targeting) like the Swedish pension system. In such a system, a targeted state 
guaranteed minimum is actually what contributes to maintain equality and thus an element 
of decommodification in outcomes.  
 Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish between targeting the poor and selecting 
out the rich as the latter does not have the stigmatizing effects associated with selectivism 
(Ferrera, 2001; Goul Andersen, 1999). Further, there is a difference between standard 
negative selectivism and a "positive" selectivism that provides targeted supplements to 
universal benefits (Thompson & Hoggett, 1996). Finally, on a closer look it emerges that 
there are in fact a very large number of ways to target social benefits de facto to the poor, 
sometimes in quite informal ways (Jensen, 2004).     
 There seems to be rather strong indications of targeting in most Anglo-Saxon wel-
fare states (Gilbert, 2002). So far, there are few really systematic comparisons of targeting 
across nations (Gilbert, 2001), but this is an area with great potentials for conceptually 
stringent in-depth studies. 
 
Shifting responsibilities 
Undoubtedly one of the most important directions of change is the shifting of responsibil-
ity for welfare from state to non-state actors described above. These institutional changes 
are highly significant in many welfare states, but it should be recalled that pure state wel-
fare has always been rare. To assess such changes, we need a governance perspective that 
takes account not just of public welfare but also of other collective arrangements and a 
variety of intermediary forms. The most important question to ask regarding such changes, 
however, is how they affect outcomes. Simple labels like privatisation or liberalisation 
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does not bring us much further. In short, a key question here is the relationship between 
institutional change and change in outcomes. Governments hope they can avoid social ef-
fects of institutional change. 
 
Enhancing market conformity and competitiveness 
Another direction of change which is important to consider is efforts towards improving 
the interplay between the welfare state and the market. Welfare policy has never simply 
been “politics against markets”, but increasing efforts have been made to enhance market 
conformity and competitiveness. The keyword “liberalisation” of the varieties of 
capitalism literature does not seem very appropriate, however; some efforts are in this 
direction, others are not. Likewise, we should avoid the term recommodification if we want 
to link this to citizenship. A large number of more specific labels have been suggested: 
Barbier (2002) speaks of an "activation of social protection". To Clasen (2005; Clasen et 
al., 2001), the keyword is increasing “conditionality" – a concept which mainly applies to 
labour market policies, however. As mentioned, yet another suggestion is "flexicurity" 
(Madsen, 2002; Wilthagen et al., 2003) which may be spelled out in several different ways. 
Finally, there is the notion of "social investment state" (Giddens, 1998; Lister, 2004) which 
emphasises that much welfare spending can be seen as an investment – and, by 
implication, should be assigned priority. All picture the adaptation of the welfare state to 
economic efficiency and competitiveness. Pfau-Effinger and Per H. Jensen takes the 
discussion one point further by claiming that citizenship itself is also being redefined as 
“Active citizenship” (Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Jensen & Pfau-Effinger, 2005) which implies 
more rights to influence, but also more obligations to participate, and more duties to be 
active and self-responsible.  
 The common denominator of all such efforts is that they do not by definition in-
volve retrenchment, let alone a deterioration of citizenship. In short, we also have to con-
sider other possible directions. 
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6. Levels of change: Paradigms, institutions, policies, expenditures or 
outcomes 
 
As mentioned, the "dependent variable debate" has been concerned with retrenchment and 
with the choice of indicators. However, the arguments can be generalised to other direc-
tions of change, and the discussion about indicators can be elevated to a discussion about 
level of indicators. Indicators in the dependent variable debate typically refer to three dif-
ferent levels: Institutions, expenditures and outcomes (in terms of micro level compensa-
tion rates which can be regarded as a sort of stylized outcome measures). Still, there are 
many other possible outcome measures, and there are two dimensions which are missing 
from the dependent variable debate: Paradigmatic/discursive change, and policy change. 
 
Changes in Paradigms / Discourse 
Hall's (1993) distinction between first-, second- and third order change refer, first and 
foremost, to changes at the ideational level. Hall's concepts were modelled on the transition 
from Keynesianism to monetarism during the Thatcher era in the UK in the 1980’s. How-
ever, the level of political conflict and institutional change found in this case cannot be 
generalised. Some changes in paradigms – which alter the entire world view, perceptions 
of causality, and goals – take place much less dramatically.  
 For instance, in Denmark, quite far-reaching changes from a demand-side per-
spective to a supply-side perspective on unemployment took place in relative tranquillity, 
even though for a long period of time, unemployment came to be seen largely as "struc-
tural" or "natural", caused by disincentives and mismatch problems, including a mismatch 
between minimum wages and qualifications among the lowest skilled. This was not associ-
ated with any immediate policy changes, but of course served to structure policies in the 
long run (Goul Andersen, 2002a). In spite of constraints, however, several policy options 
remained; to meet productivity requirements of high minimum wages, the Social Democ-
rats wanted to use active labour market policies and upgrading of qualifications, in contrast 
to the straight market strategies preferred by the bourgeois parties at that time.  Still other 
parties wanted to solve the wage-productivity gap by subsidies. All these competing strate-
gies could to a large extent be formulated within a structural unemployment paradigm. In 
short: The new paradigm constituted a constraint, but it did not determine policies. This 
also explains why it was accepted with little resistance. However, this also means that 
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changes in short- and medium term outcomes, as seen from a citizenship perspective, were 
relatively small.  
 This certainly does not mean that this change in paradigm or elite discourse ("co-
ordination discourse" - as contrasted to "communicative discourse" aimed at persuading 
voters, see Schmidt, 2002) is unimportant. Even if it does not fully determine the selection 
of future policies, it is of course an important constraint. And those institutions or power 
relations which limit the impact on outcomes (citizenship) at one point of time may disap-
pear at a later point. 
 To conclude, paradigmatic or discursive change constitutes a separate sub-
dimension or level of change, not the end of a unidimensional continuum of change. 
 
Changes in policies and institutions 
The distinction between policy change and institutional change is not very clear-cut, and 
some researchers prefer not to speak about policies as institutions. Institutionalism has 
taken two directions which could be labelled the veto point literature and the path depend-
ence literature, respectively. The first is the original one. A classic definition of institutions 
is found in Douglass North (1990: 3) who refer to institutions as “the rules of the game in a 
society or, more generally …… the humanly devised constraints that shape human interac-
tion”. The “rules of the game” has traditionally been taken to mean formal and sometimes 
informal political institutions. In accordance with this definition, one direction of institu-
tionalism in comparative welfare state research has emphasized the “status quo bias of po-
litical institutions” (Pierson, 2004: 42), and in particular the multiple veto points in politi-
cal institutions (Bonoli, 2001).  
 The most relevant field of institutionalism here is the one dealing with policies as 
institutions, however. As argued by Pierson (2004, 2006), policies can also be seen as a 
kind of institutions: “For the individuals and social organizations ... public policies are ... 
central rules governing their interactions. These rules specify rewards and punishments 
associated with particular behaviors, ranging from eligibility ... to large fines (or) incar-
ceration .... the institutions that impinge on the modern citizen most directly and inten-
sively ... are in fact public policies, not the formal political institutions that have preoccu-
pied political scientists” (Pierson, 2004:165).  Unlike Pierson, however, most scholars dis-
tinguish between policies and institutions and maintain that some but not all policies count 
as institutions. But the distinction and the definitions are seldom very precise. Pierson in 
fact himself only refers to “major public policies” as "institutions" (2004: 165). Streeck & 
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Thelen (2005: 12) argue that “policies ... are institutions ... to the extent that they constitute 
rules for actors other than for the policymakers themselves - rules that can and need to be 
implemented and that are legitimate in that they will if necessary be enforced by agents 
acting on behalf of society as a whole”. Green-Pedersen (2002) has perhaps provided the 
most plausible and simple delineation in defining institutions as the “programmatic struc-
ture” of (concrete) policies. 
 Policy changes like changes in the level of public expenditure or taxes, or chang-
ing compensation rates in a particular field, may be highly interesting in their own right, 
but what concerns us mostly here is institutional change. A three per cent reduction in un-
employment benefits or a one per cent increase in social expenditure would count as a pol-
icy change, but if it's just a one-shot phenomenon, it would hardly count as an institutional 
change. 
 What kind of institutional changes, then, should concern us the most? It should be 
noted that this discussion may often be related to basic conceptions of the welfare state. In 
the first place, if we take a welfare regime approach, we could focus on changes in the 
basic principles of eligibility, entitlements and financing. We could also find other deter-
minants of de- or recommodification, and of de-familialization, as suggested by Esping-
Andersen (1990, 1999). More concretely, this could involve questions about universalism 
vs. targeting (means testing), flat-rate universalism vs. income-replacement universalism, 
contribution financing vs. tax financing, degree of actuarial equity vs. equality (like the 
difference between defined contribution and defined benefit schemes), etc. As to de-
familialization, indicators could be tax rules for couples, expenditures on social transfers 
vs. social services, etc. etc. However, as such, the concepts of de-commodification and de-
familialization are basically outcome measures, unlike for instance Korpi & Palme's (1998) 
more precisely defined five ideal types of institutional principles: residual, voluntary state-
subsidized, corporatist, beveridgean flat-rate universalism, and encompassing (earnings-
related) model.  
 As Esping-Andersen (1999) reminds us, however, the welfare state can also be 
discussed as an insurance system, and/or as a division of labour. If we conceive of the wel-
fare state as an insurance system, the crucial institutional variables are about risk coverage 
and risk pooling. Liberal welfare states have low scores on both dimensions; Conservative/ 
Christian Democratic welfare states are usually described as having moderately high risk 
coverage, but relatively low risk pooling - otherwise they become hybrids like the Dutch 
pension system; and Social Democratic welfare states score high on both dimensions. 
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What is particularly interesting from this point of view may be tendencies towards privati-
sation of social risk. For instance when defined benefit pension schemes are changed into 
strictly defined contribution pension schemes, this involves a privatisation of social risk as 
risk pooling declines. This holds even more if these schemes are fully funded, and if they 
are limited to a specified number of years.  
 Finally, from a division-of-labour perspective, the main question is how responsi-
bility for welfare is shared between the state, the family, the market, voluntary associa-
tions, (social responsibility of) firms, and the social partners (collective agreements). For 
instance, collective labour market pensions or completely individual pensions may crowd 
out state pensions, user charges may be raised, or social services may be outsourced to 
private providers. This issue of privatisation was discussed above.  
 Even though expenditure measures are usually not considered very interesting as 
such, it seems unavoidable to include such measures as well. The question whether the 
welfare state is being altogether downsized or “only” subject to priorities, always remains 
an important contextual information.   
 
Outcomes 
Even though institutional changes are of main concern, what counts in the final analysis, is 
outcomes, and the impact of institutions on outcomes. For instance, what is most interest-
ing about changes in responsibilities for pensions is whether they contribute to increasing 
insecurity, inequality or poverty among pensioners.  
 It is not at all difficult to imagine of institutionally similar systems that produce 
quite different outcomes in different national contexts. For instance, new public manage-
ment may have quite different impact in an American and a Scandinavian context. Con-
versely, institutionally different systems may produce similar outcomes. The Scandinavian 
pension systems is a case in point: They have all moved away from classical universalism 
and would currently be classified as multipillar systems and social insurance systems, re-
spectively (Bonoli, 2003). But with a few adjustments, they could easily end up producing 
relatively similar outcomes (if anything, the most privatised system in Denmark will 
probably produce less inequality than state-run systems in the rest of Scandinavia, see also 
Pedersen, 2007).  
 To assess outcomes, we often need to know a lot about implementation. For in-
stance, what is interesting about changing conditionality in labour market policies is to 
what degree it is actually implemented. There may be a gap between formal requirement 
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and actual practices. To take one more Danish example, unemployed people can be re-
quired to commute up to four hours a day, and they are obliged to take any job from day 
one. But to what degree are these formal rules applied in practice? Unless we know about 
this, it is difficult to assess and classify the system. One can even imagine that formal insti-
tutions remain unchanged but that outcomes change dramatically if practices of administra-
tion suddenly change. Implementation may be extremely complex when we speak of con-
ditionality on the labour market (Barbier, 2005).  
 Considering the output, it again becomes crucial to consider the ensemble of insti-
tutions - for instance the entire configuration of a multipillar pension system (or at least its 
collective components). Looking at the state component in isolation would provide a 
highly biased impression. In particular, occupational welfare and new forms of social re-
sponsibilities of firms are important to take into consideration (e.g. Hacker, 2004, 2005), 
and this holds at least as much for collective agreements between social partners which 
may often have almost the same material impact as ordinary laws. 
 
7. Degree and dynamics of change; path dependence and path departure 
 
If we are interested in institutional change, one could argue that we should look for those 
path-breaking reforms where transformative institutional changes take place. However, as 
pointed out by Streeck & Thelen (2005), there is not a one-to-one correspondence between 
degree of change (transformative vs. maintaining) and dynamic of change (abrupt vs. in-
cremental). This correspondence is implied by the “punctuated equilibrium model” which 
was imported from evolutionary biology to studies of policy making processes by 
Baumgartner & Jones (1993) who concluded that “…our government can best be under-
stood as a series of institutionally enforced stabilities, periodically punctuated by dramatic 
change” (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993: 251). This picture of long periods of stability inter-
rupted by periods of more far-reaching reforms is also implied in many theories of path 
dependence. 
 As far as path dependence is concerned, there are various interpretations. When 
the concept first surfaced in the comparative welfare state literature, it was often taken to 
mean stability or stasis. Later, there have been two main lines of interpretations. One is 
seeing path dependence more as a perspective than as a theory: Path dependence means 
that future decisions depend on past decisions because the outcome of past decisions struc-
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ture opportunities of action, power relations, and perceptions of interests. However, Pier-
son (2000) contends that path dependence should be developed into a theory like in institu-
tional economics from which the concept was originally borrowed. Elaborating on Stinch-
combe’s (1968) notions of positive and negative feedback models, Pierson suggests that 
path dependence is an instance of positive feedback (and thus a very dynamic phenome-
non) where a mechanism is installed which systematically draws development in one direc-
tion and creates a situation of “lock in” where it becomes more or less impossible (mainly 
due to political – or administrative – costs) to escape that path. The emphasis on mecha-
nisms is valuable; however, the drawback of insisting on path dependence as a theory is 
that it almost takes exogenous changes to break a path.9 In other words, the model easily 
becomes too deterministic, leaving space only for few instances of path breaking, caused 
by major exogenous challenges (Ebbinghaus, 2005). 
 However, as mentioned above, there has recently been a (re-) discovery of the 
transformative capacity of incremental change (Lindblom, 1959; Goul Andersen, 2001; 
Goul Andersen & Larsen, 2002; Hinrichs & Kangas, 2003; to some extent, Pierson's 
(1994) "systemic retrenchment" could even be counted in here). Ebbinghaus (2005, 2006) 
suggests to supplement the distinction between path dependence and path breaking/path 
switching (which is rare) by the concept “path departure” to denote a situation where poli-
cies slowly – sometimes invisibly - adapt: Past decisions constrain future decisions, but 
they do not determine them, and new mechanisms of change may slowly evolve (see also 
Goul Andersen, 2001; Palier, 2001; Lessenich, 2005; Pierson, 2004).  
 Streeck & Thelen (2005) have summarized a number of mechanisms of gradual 
transformation: Layering, drift, and conversion.10  The former refers to a new scheme be-
ing imposed on existing schemes, gradually growing in importance and perhaps even rele-
gating the original scheme to a marginal position. Pension schemes is the classical illustra-
tion of this. Drift refers to the failure to adapt existing schemes to new and increasing 
needs determined by changes in the environment. Decline in occupational welfare – inter-
nal labour markets – is a standard example, but the lack of adaptation to a number of new 
social risks can be analysed along these lines. Conversion refers to existing institutions 
being taken over and being redirected to new goals via the control over implementation 
and daily administration. Not least in the field of labour market policy, there are many such 
opportunities. It is worth remarking en passant that conversion denotes a situation where 
                                                 
9  Pierson’s own writings in fact seem to be consistent with this. 
10 Their typology also includes displacement and  exhaustion which we leave out here. 
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actors matter whereas institutions does not really matter quite as much as we were taught 
to believe in the 1990’s. Further, drift denotes a situation where the absence of institutional 
change has transformative effects in a changing context (Hacker, 2004). 
 It will be recalled that assessing degree of change was a main aim of Hall's (1993) 
distinction between first-, second- and third order change referred to above.  However, this 
conceptualisation is undermined by the notion of incremental but transformative change. 
Paradigmatic changes may take place as silent revolutions, without much immediate im-
pact on policies or institutions, let alone outcomes. And most importantly, cumulation of 
small first-order changes such as gradual, but substantial reduction of compensation rates, 
may indeed be tantamount to major institutional change in the long run (Streeck & Thelen, 
2005). 
By implication, even making institutional change the key object of analysis is prob-
lematical according to these insights: Drift means that absence of change can be transfor-
mative if the context changes, and conversion describes how apparently stable institutions 
can be modified to serve entirely different goals than those for which they were originally 
designed (Pierson, 2004; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). As a minimum, this means that institu-
tions must always be evaluated in context. 
 
8. Policy feedback and convergence/divergence 
 
Finally we briefly discuss the feedback process, the question of temporary equilibria, and 
the question of convergence vs. divergence. As it is very difficult to evaluate change in a 
snapshot, considerations of most likely futures are necessary. This is particularly relevant 
in relation to the mixed economy of welfare. For instance, at a given point of time, 
different institutional configurations may produce equivalent outcomes, say, between 
multipillar and social insurance pensions systems; but feedback mechanisms may install 
different trajectories so that the long-run effects will nevertheless diverge.  
 The question of policy feedback involves a brief review of the "independent 
variable problem" - what are the drivers of change: Economic necessity, political power, 
institutional dynamics, or ideas? Even though Pierson (1994, 1998, 2001) has provided 
invaluable insights in the politics of retrenchment, it is doubtful whether determinants of 
change are so fundamentally different now from what they were previously. It is 
questionable to what extent welfare states are in a condition of “permanent austerity”. But 
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first and foremost, it is questionable whether austerity is the most fundamental underlying 
source of change. As mentioned, this would be consistent with the theory of path 
dependence as positive feedback mechanisms. However, there is almost always some room 
for manoeuvre, and even though there are institutional constraints, politics and interest 
conflict arguably are as important as ever as determinants of welfare state change. 
 Among drivers of change, we have also included the term "institutional dynamics" 
which once could seem a contradictio in adjectio; however, in the first place, path depend-
ence is exactly about "positive feedback" (Pierson, 2000), not a static phenomenon, and 
even if we stick to the less ambitious perspective on path dependence as a perspective, this 
does not mean that the insights regarding mechanisms are discarded. Moreover, some insti-
tutional configurations are inherently unstable and far from any "lock in", let alone "deep 
equilibrium" (Pierson, 2004). 
 This is especially important when we consider feedback effects of changing wel-
fare states towards new mixes of private and public. There is currently an interest every-
where in shifting financial responsibility from the state to non-state arrangements in order 
to enhance financial sustainability amid the ageing problem. In principle, it is possible to 
construct new combinations of public and private which produce similar outcomes; the 
question is whether changing power relations and (other) institutional dynamics will main-
tain this situation or lead away from it. For instance, when new private interests emerge, 
say, in health care, they will increasingly affect future decisions in the field. 
 Finally, turning to the issue of convergence vs. divergence, we need to supple-
ment the usual dichotomy with the notion of “parallel trends, persistent diversity” (Kautto 
& Kvist, 2002). That is, similar changes (like targeting) may be observable across welfare 
states, but at different levels. In some universal welfare states, targeting according to eco-
nomic criteria remains a rare phenomenon, but even though it appears in more situations 
than previously, this has been particularly expanded in welfare states that already relied on 
targeted arrangements (Gilbert, 2002). 
 Still, it is also imaginable that welfare states with different institutional points of 
departure, due to similarities in political forces as well as in exogenous pressures, will find 
ways to produce equivalent results regardless of enduring institutional differences. In the-
ory, this is described be the mechanisms of conversion and drift; and in practical politics, 
such a notion of functional equivalence is embodied in the open method of coordination in 
the EU. 
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9. Conclusions 
 
Above, we have tried to argue that it is futile to look for one overriding dimension or one 
overriding conception of welfare state change. Existing concepts all have their advantages 
and their drawbacks, but most of them cover only one or very few dimensions. Even 
though we should try to remain as parsimonious as possible, a unidimensional conception 
of change seems impossible to maintain, both as far as direction and as far as strength of 
change is concerned.  
 We suggest that the current confusion about change can best be reduced if we 
distinguish between different dimensions and levels of change and consider the ensemble 
of institutions collectively providing social welfare. As to the last point, it is a matter of 
choosing a governance approach addressing the mix of institutions involved in (collective) 
social responsibilities, rather than a government approach focussing narrowly on the role of 
the state. In particular, if we want to consider the outcome of change, it is essential to in-
clude the role of non-state actors and the possibility of obtaining equivalent outcomes by 
different institutional configurations. For instance, from an institutional perspective, Scan-
dinavian pension systems have moved in diametrically opposite directions and have little 
in common anymore; however, it is not unlikely that they will produce sufficiently equiva-
lent outcomes to justify a classification into a common Scandinavian model in spite of in-
stitutional divergence. This is not to suggest a replacement of institutionalism by function-
alism, only to save the notion of "functional equivalence" as a possibility (see also Øver-
bye, 1994). 
 At any rate, a more intersubjective assessment of changes seems possible if we 
give up the narrow focus on state welfare. Further, we should include services and not just 
social transfers. We should give up the assumption that change is mainly about retrench-
ment or recommodification – changes may take several different directions. We should 
give up the assumption that welfare states are characterised by stasis, interrupted by critical 
junctures of far- reaching reform. Welfare states are constantly changing, and some of 
these marginal adjustments may add up to transformative (sometimes even self-
reinforcing) change. But first and foremost, we should distinguish clearly between discur-
sive change, institutional change, policy change, expenditure change, and in particular 
changes in outcomes, as judged from a citizenship perspective. 
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